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Saying Thanks with Some Self-Reflection 
JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL† 
It would be best for me to begin with a character trait—
perverseness. The easiest way to get me interested in 
something is to tell me that I should not pay attention to it. 
Thus, coming out of law school I should have been a Law and 
Society lifer. 
The program at the law school of the University of 
Chicago, like most, was an exercise in doctrinal explication. 
We were pushed away from both Social Science and 
American Legal Realism, even though both were part of the 
school’s heritage. In the contracts course I was exposed to 
excerpts from Stewart Macaulay’s research on contracting 
practice, though absolutely nothing was done with that 
research. For me it was the only interesting thing in the 
course. My contracts teacher did not agree with me and 
graded my exams accordingly. Scratching around at the 
edges of the curriculum, I found an interdisciplinary 
seminar, the second best of the six seminars I took. It was 
about what we called the battered child problem and 
included time with a faculty member in the Medical School 
who did several classes on the etiology and diagnosis of 
battering. The law part was dumb. The even better seminar 
 
†This piece was prepared during the so far height of the Corona-19 virus 
outbreak, when it seemed more possible that I might not outlive this project. It 
still seems relevant and I wish to thank the Buffalo Law Review for letting me 
contribute it. 
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was one on statistical methods given by Hans Zeisel, taught 
out of his book Say It with Figures. That course has held me 
in good stead for 53 years. I became entranced with American 
Legal Realism in a contemporary jurisprudence seminar that 
otherwise convinced me that jurisprudence was a boring 
waste of time. A similar seminar devoted to H.L.A. Hart’s 
The Concept of Law did not alter that opinion. 
Of course, neither Social Science nor Realism was of any 
use in my five years in Legal Services practice. There I 
discovered that law was mostly routine, at least after I 
absorbed two years of writing lessons. The underlying 
economic and social problems were almost always far more 
interesting than the complaint and brief writing that 
occupied most of my time. 
Once I got to Buffalo in 1973 the atmosphere was 
conducive to returning to the possible social science 
trajectory that had garnered my interest in law school. Mark 
Galanter’s Friday seminar was the center of the intellectual 
life in the school. The speakers consisted primarily of Marc’s 
young social scientist friends. Our Dean, “Red” Schwartz, the 
first law school dean who was not a lawyer, was central to 
the group that established the Law and Society Association. 
He and Marc organized the first “National Meeting” of 
members of the group. It was held here in Buffalo at the end 
of my second year on the faculty. This enterprise later 
became the LSA’s Annual Meetings. And so—though some 
chance was involved—it is not surprising that I quickly 
began work on early social science research undertaken by 
the American Legal Realists. 
I attended several Law and Society meetings and even 
gave papers there as late as 1986, but beginning in the early 
Eighties I began to drift away from the group. At the time I 
didn’t understand why. I told myself that the Critical Legal 
Studies group seemed more interesting. Later, I came to 
understand that a significant amount of my lack of interest 
was because I couldn’t endure, i.e. was bored by, the endless 
stream of research that demonstrated that there was a 
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difference between the law on the books and the law in 
action, as if Roscoe Pound had offered the final insight into 
law. The recurrent call for better law to close that gap left me 
equally cold. Instead, I wanted to see research that explored 
the reasons for the continuity of results that filled LSA’s 
annual meetings. The group was also growing too large for 
my taste. 
That the Critical Legal Studies group was more 
interesting at the outset was undoubtedly true. It was 
smaller. It was livelier. And it seemed at the time more likely 
to come up with good reasons for why law, as a practice, was 
as it was. I should have known that there was something 
wrong in the enterprise when at the group’s first meeting 
most of the law and society types were pushed out, but I 
didn’t. The growth of the group here in Buffalo with the 
addition of Fred Konefsky, Guyora Binder and Errol 
Meidinger, Betty Mench and Alan Freeman, in addition to Al 
Katz, my personal, skeptical Yoda, and for a brief while, Bob 
Gordon, made CLS feel like home, however much we argued 
with each other, and did we argue. Friendships beyond 
Buffalo—David Trubek, Duncan Kennedy, Peter Gable, 
Mike Fishel, Jay Feinman, Karl Klare, Kathy Stone and 
Gary Peller—gave me a sense of belonging to a national 
network that just might make some changes in how law was 
taught. Even more importantly, I felt excited by the implicit 
resurrection of the thought of the American Legal Realists 
who had so captured my interest when I was in law school by 
being told to stay away from that stuff. 
I went to most of the early CLS meetings, even to an 
international gathering of the clan, and with Fred hosted a 
CLS meeting here in Buffalo, but I drifted away from CLS 
too, though somewhat later than from the Law and Society 
group. Again, at the time I didn’t understand why. I told 
myself that the group gathered around the Test 
Development and Research Committee of the Law School 
Admission Council was more interesting. In time I came to 
understand that a significant amount of my lack of interest 
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in CLS was because the theory about the structure of 
doctrine that was initially so attractive to me became less 
attractive when I realized that the group was unwilling to 
turn that theory back upon itself after the growth of allied 
movements—Critical Feminism and Critical Race Theory—
that asserted the groundedness of their critique, a 
groundedness that we had denied was possible in law. It 
didn’t hurt that few of the crew wanted to talk about 
anything other than doctrine, which, by then, I had begun to 
avoid as much as possible in my classes, as I already had in 
my writing. 
For a while the little group that I had found in LSAC was 
quite interesting and then it too wasn’t. Watching really 
intelligent people work to build a better test was 
enlightening. But when I learned that better did not include 
different and different included grading scales that would 
make it hard for law schools to admit students just on the 
numbers, I pretty much gave up before being asked to leave. 
Though I kept some friends—George Dawson, Fred Hart, 
Dan Ortiz, John Portmann, Phil Shelton and Peter 
Winograd—in the end I was left with only history as a 
possible center to my academic identity. 
I had long identified myself as an historian and 
irregularly attended meetings of the American Society for 
Legal History where I gave my first scholarly paper, an 
activity that I quickly came to despise. I was even then too 
old to be talked at and was not all that interested in 
associating with those who were not. Still, I acquired a 
wonderful group of friends there in addition to those who 
have taken the time to contribute to this odd enterprise—
Laura Kalman, Mike Churgin, Bruce Mann, Avi Soifer, and 
Ray Solomon. The organization as a whole, however, was 
really quite stuffy and its meetings were of little interest to 
me because very few of its members were Twentieth Century 
historians. The most fun was sitting in the hallways reading 
my newspaper and talking with the friends who happened to 
pass by. 
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For me, the intellectual attractiveness of the group was 
its distance from a focus on law reform, a legal academic style 
that I call, stealing from my buddy Pierre Schlag, normative 
legal thought. It was another activity I could no longer stand 
since it was built on wishful thinking given that it treated as 
irrelevant the history and embeddedness of social and 
economic practice and ignored the possibility that all right 
thinking people might not think alike. It thus legitimated a 
purposeful ignorance of the concerns of non-right thinking 
people, and rejected all of those years of Law and Society 
research that, despite its practitioners’ denial, pretty firmly 
demonstrated that legal doctrine was not a particularly good 
vehicle for altering the structure of American life. Even 
worse, it ignored the doctrinal work of Critical Legal Studies. 
It is here where my perverseness needs to return to the 
forefront. After a while, I began to understand that for me 
Critical Legal Studies was attractive because the Law and 
Society people didn’t approve of it and Law and Society was 
attractive because Critical Legal Studies people didn’t 
approve of it. Thus, it is not even slightly surprising that I 
became attracted to post-modern thought because a portion 
of both the Law and Society and Critical Legal Studies 
crowds didn’t approve of it. Katz’s interest in Foucault had 
been a part of my intellectual life for a while and then, in the 
late Eighties, I met, first in print, then in person, Pierre, who 
was more interested in Derrida and Barthes than Foucault. 
Acceptance of post-modern thought was thus a “threefer,” 
since the historians wish to be seen as practitioners of a 
social science meant that fancy French thought was snubbed 
there too. Even worse, no one other than Duncan and Peter 
seem to have been interested in the Existentialism from my 
youth that somehow bubbled up from somewhere in my head 
at about the same time as post-modernism did. 
I have come to think that my susceptibility to French 
thought coming out of the darkness of the 1930’s and World 
War II could be explained by my having grown up in the 
years when school children were ordered to do something so 
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obviously irrational as to hide under our desks and cover our 
heads in case of an atomic attack.  One learns to go on despite 
the possibility of oblivion. It was the only sensible thing to 
do. The otherness of the other thus seemed obvious too, as 
did the necessity for making Kierkegaard’s leap of faith and 
the importance of Buber’s Thou. Somehow all these things fit 
with the necessity to escape from the totalitarian subjection 
of the text in its polymorphous perversity and from the 
equally totalitarian grip of disciplinary boundaries of 
thought, two of many quite minor correlatives that followed 
from an example of reason gone mad. 
And so, for about twenty-five years I have pretty much 
had to find my way on my own with the understanding that, 
as is the case for all people, I speak from my non-privileged 
position, a place I have perforce had to choose. Hopefully, I 
have chosen well. The results may not be pretty, but this is 
about where I come out in my life with law. 
1. To see and teach law as a system of rules is a category 
mistake. Not that there are no rules or that they are not 
relevant to the doing of law, but rather that their meaning is 
not an analytic, linguistic or philosophical matter. Law gets 
its meaning in and from the social, economic and historical 
context in which it is to be found . . . and vice-versa.  
2. In such a world, the rule of law is best seen not as the 
law of rules, but as a desire for not perfect, but reasonable 
administrative regularity in any aspect of government. 
3. Thus, the space between the law on the books and the 
law in action might best be understood as instantiating the 
following proposition: Law enacts the dominant culture and 
if not, that culture modifies law. No culture is wholly 
coherent; so to expect that law be coherent is silly. And it is 
in that in-between space that an opposition to the 
totalitarian tendency embedded in “It’s the LAW!” can be 
found. 
4. So, for me both Law and Society and Critical Legal 
Studies fundamentally misunderstood law, though in similar 
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ways. Both took the rules as rules too seriously. One should 
expect that there will be a space between the law on the 
books and the law in action. Similarly, one should expect that 
the rules will work to enact the dominant culture. It would 
be really notable were one to find that these two propositions 
were not true. In the former case one would worry about an 
authoritarian government and in the latter, a repressive 
utopian society. 
5. Similarly, law is best seen and taught not as a system 
of rules to be justified by the professorial cast, but rather as 
a practice, an activity of humans exercising judgment in a 
time and place when trying both to secure actions deemed by 
them to be beneficial to themselves or detrimental to others 
and/or to alter or reinforce the dominant culture, by gaining 
the aid of governmental action. Both are perfectly acceptable 
activities for humans and are regularly seen in the nation 
states of the North Atlantic. 
6. The teaching of law has long, perhaps forever, 
decentered the exercise of judgment—good, bad and 
indifferent—from the practice it purports to teach, but more 
accurately understood, to help others learn. This sidelining 
of judgment has always been a problem for understanding 
law, defensible only in terms of a perhaps intentionally 
misleading conception of the rule of law, but more likely in 
terms of a refusal to face the problem that is judgment, that 
of openly giving disputable reasons for coercive actions taken 
with often mixed motives. 
7. The displacement of judgment in the individual case 
with normative legal thought’s focus on the general case 
presents two problems. The first is the dubious notion that 
as a condition for the receipt of a license to practice law, a 
trade, everyone should be required to pay good money to 
listen to the law professoriate’s understanding of what 
qualifies as good law. Doing so is an embarrassment. The 
second is the implication that comes from partial critique 
undertaken in the doctrinal classroom each day that the 
great balance of law is justified, or at least justifiable, an 
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insidious notion in the hands of once students who have 
swallowed whole the proposition that the rule of law is the 
law of rules. Doing so leads to rule mongering of the most 
blatant type. 
But this is not all I think I have figured out, for in a 
different, but related register I would argue -- 
8. Just as law seen as a system of always effective rules 
can be totalitarian, the ways of knowing about it and the 
world that it instantiates and that instantiates it can be 
equally so. And for the same reason. Reason, and its good 
friend critique, has in itself the capacity for totalitarian 
behavior, since it demarks that which it sees as unreason, 
based solely on its self-understanding of the world that it 
surveys, a self-understanding that it labels “truth.” “Error” I 
can accept, but not “truth,” for “truth” is a demarking of what 
can and can’t be known, especially disciplinarily. Such a 
demarking is bad because it negates the possibility that so-
called error just might better explain what is thought to be 
already known, as well as make understandable that which 
is, by the definition of truth, unknown and unknowable. 
9. That opening to the unknown, that action requiring a 
leap of faith in resistance to the taken-for-granteds of 
academic life in the bureaucratic university, is what gives 
meaning to the activity of learning that is both teaching and 
research, an activity to which each of us has devoted a life. 
10. (Available for future learning.) 
 
And so, as Siegmund Warburg said, “The greatest 
adventure is thinking.” With that observation in mind, I am 
pleased to assert as loudly as my voice will carry, a fairly far 
way as I have learned, that I have enjoyed thinking with all 
of you. May we all continue to be able to keep at it! 
